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Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International
Criminal Justice
ROBERT CRYER∗
Abstract
The UN Security Council has recently referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the Inter-
national Criminal Court. This has been hailed as a breakthrough in international criminal
justice. However, aspects of the referral resolution can be criticized from the point of view of
their consistencywithboth theRomeStatuteand theUNCharter.The limitationsof the referral
with respect to whom the Court may investigate also raise issues with respect to the rule of
law. In addition, Sudan has accused the Security Council of acting in a neo-colonial fashion by
referring the situation in Darfur to the Court. This article investigates these criticisms against
the background of the international system inwhich international criminal law operates, and
concludes that although the referral cannot be considered neo-colonial in nature, the referral
can be criticized as selective and as an incomplete reaction to the crisis in Darfur. The referral
remains, however, a positive step.
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1. INTRODUCTION
After Rwanda, itmight be thought that the lessons of international criminal lawhad
become inculcated: that the cycle of atrocity, cries of ‘never again’, occasional prosec-
ution, and then the repetitionof those atrocities elsewherehadbeenbroken.1 Justice
mighthavewonoutover realpolitik.After all, thecreationof the InternationalCrim-
inalTribunal for the formerYugoslavia (ICTY) led to thecreationof the International
CriminalTribunal forRwanda (ICTR), andboth together strongly inﬂuenced the cre-
ation of the International Criminal Court (ICC).2 Many have considered, with some
justiﬁcation, that the ICC represents a decisive swing from politics to law in inter-
national affairs.3 This is only partially true. It is unquestionable that the creation of
∗ School of Law, University of Nottingham. This article began life as a paper given to the Human Rights
Research Unit, University of Leeds. I am very grateful to Ian Cram for his invitation to give a paper there,
and to the participants for the enlightening discussion. Thanks are owed to David Fraser, Ha˚kan Friman,
RobertMcCorquodale, Dirk van Zyl Smit, andNigelWhite for their comments, and to Sangeeta Shah for her
comments and expert editing.
1. On which see S. Chesterman, ‘Never Again . . . And Again: Law, Order and the Gender of War Crimes in
Bosnia’, (1997) 22 Yale Journal of International Law 299.
2. See R. Cryer, ‘Human Rights and the Question of International Courts and Tribunals’, in M. C. Davis et al.
(eds.), International Intervention in the Post-ColdWarWorld: Moral Responsibility and Power Politics (2002), 60, at
62–7.
3. See, e.g., M. C. Bassiouni, ‘The Permanent International Criminal Court’, in P. Sands and M. Lattimer (eds.),
Justice for Crimes Against Humanity (2003), 173, at 211. Bassiouni also notes, however, that ‘the ICC will not
be a panacea for all ills’ (ibid.).
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the ICC has a synergistic relationship with the increased importance enjoyed by in-
ternational criminal law in the last decade or so. However, we should not simply see
the ICC as the overcoming of politics. AsMartti Koskenniemi has said, ‘Institutions
do not replace politics, but enact them.’4 The ICC is, to a large extent, about enacting
a politics of accountability. But politics are rarely black and white. The ICC is by no
means free of politics and the swing towards accountability has by no means been
unequivocal. Nor does it enjoy universal support.5 In addition to explaining the
action that has been taken by the UN Security Council in relation to Darfur, and its
legal basis, this articlewill attempt to relate those actions tomore general themes in
international criminal justice. Aswe shall see, although the reaction to the crimes in
Sudan is likely to have been different from that which would have occurred in, say,
1993,6 a number of perennial problems related to international criminal law have
arisen. But if the teeth of those problems have not been pulled, they have perhaps
been blunted a little.
2. SUDAN: ITS HISTORY AND CONFLICTS7
Sudan is the largest state in Africa, covering 2.5 million sq km and bordering the
Red Sea. It is not a state with a happy recent history. It is a place to which all the
cliche´s of a statebeingblessedandcursedwithnatural resources are fully applicable.
On its southern borders lie the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, whose
governments have referred situations to the ICC primarily because of actions in the
north of their countries.8 To Sudan’s south-west lies the Central African Republic,
which has also referred itself to the ICC.9 To Sudan’s east lie Eritrea and Ethiopia,
both of which are attempting to recover from decades of conﬂict. Themost stable of
its neighbours are Chad, Egypt, Libya, and Kenya.
Sudan achieved independence from the United Kingdom in 1956. Since then
conﬂicts traditionally considered tobebetweenthenorthandsouthof thecountry,10
4. M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1878–1960 (2001), 177
(emphasis in original).
5. The United States, for example, remains highly equivocal; see, e.g., D. Forsythe, ‘The United States and Inter-
national Criminal Justice’, (2002) 24Human Rights Quarterly 974. China and a number of states, particularly
in theMiddle East and Asia, remain similarly unconvinced of the desirability of the ICC.
6. As PayamAkhavannoted in relation to the creationof the ICTR, if the crimes inRwandahadbeen committed
prior to those in Yugoslavia, it is not clear that a tribunal would have been set up. P. Akhavan, ‘The Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment’, (1996) 90 AJIL 501, at
501.
7. A useful primer on Sudan and the conﬂict in Darfur may be found in the Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, 25 January 2005 (hereafter Report of the International Commission),
paras. 40–72. The classic study of the area is A. deWaal, Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan (2005).
8. ICC Press Releases, 29 January 2004 (Uganda), 19 April 2004 (DRC). See C. Kress, ‘Self-Referrals and “Waivers
of Complementarity”’, (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 944; P. Gaeta, ‘Is the Practice of “Self-
Referrals” a Sound Start for the ICC?’, (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 949.
9. ICC Press Release, 7 Jan. 2005.
10. The real situation is somewhatmore complex, as personnel from thenorthﬁght for the south, and vice versa.
The conﬂict could also be considered one between the centre and periphery in Sudan; see, e.g., A. de Waal,
War in Sudan: An Analysis of Conﬂict (1990). Since, however, the conﬂict in Darfur could also be described as
a centre–periphery one, in order to distinguish the two conﬂicts, the conﬂict that began in 1983 and ended
in 2005 will be described, admittedly not entirely accurately, as the north–south conﬂict.
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whichwas uniﬁed by theUnitedKingdomonly in 1947, have been fairly consistent,
ashavemilitarycoupsandattemptedcoups.Thediscoveryofoil insouthernSudanin
the 1970s has only served to increase tensions, since revenues have been perceived
to be unequally distributed by the government. The conﬂict between north and
southwas recentlyhalted by theComprehensive PeaceAgreement of 7 January 2005
reached between the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
(SPLM). However, the conﬂict between north and south is by no means the only
tension in Sudan. Inter-religious relations are weak, and other geographical regions
feel theyhavebeenleftouteconomicallyandpolitically. Inter-tribal tensionsrelating
to resources and regional tensions generally in the west of Sudan led to a return to
violence in2003,when two local groups, the SudanLiberationMovement (SLM) and
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rose up against the government, seeking
greater political voice and development for the region. The name of the region is
now sadly familiar throughout the world: Darfur.11
Early on in the Darfur conﬂict, the SLM and JEM achieved a number of victories
against the government,whichbecame concerned that it couldnot counter the SLM
andJEMalone. Its responsetotheseearlySLM/JEMgainswasaccuratelysummarized
by the acting UNHigh Commissioner of Human Rights, Bertrand Ramcharan:
The government of Sudan appears to have sponsored a militia composed of a loose
collection of ﬁghters, apparently of Arab background, mainly from Darfur, known
as the ‘Janjaweed’. In other words, and worryingly, what appears to have been an
ethnically based rebellion has beenmetwith an ethnically based response, building in
large part on long-standing, but largely hitherto contained, tribal rivalries. In certain
areas of Darfur, the Janjaweed have supported the regular armed forces in attacking
and targetingcivilianpopulations suspectedof supporting the rebellion,while inother
locations, it appears that the Janjaweed have played the primary role in such attacks
with the military in support.12
11. The Secretary-General has issued a large number of reports that deal with the situation in Darfur; see, e.g.,
Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan Pursuant to Paragraph 15 of Security Council Resolution 1564
(2004) and paragraphs 6, 13, and 16 of Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), 4 October 2004, UN Doc.
S/2004/787; Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan Pursuant to Paragraph 15 of Security Council
Resolution 1564 (2004) and paragraphs 6, 13, and 16 of Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), 2November
2004,UNDoc. S/2004/881; Report of the Secretary-General on the SudanPursuant to Paragraph15of Security
Council Resolution 1564 (2004) and paragraphs 6, 13, and 16 of Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004) and
paragraph 17 of Security Council Resolution 1574 (2004), 3 December 2004, UN Doc. S/2004/947; Report of
the Secretary-General on the SudanPursuant to Paragraph15 of SecurityCouncil Resolution 1564 (2004) and
paragraphs 6, 13, and 16 of Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004) and Paragraph 17 of Security Council
Resolution 1574 (2004), 7 January 2005, UN Doc. S/2005/10; Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan
Pursuant to Paragraph 15 of Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004) and paragraphs 6, 13, and 16 of Security
Council Resolution 1556 (2004) and Paragraph 17 of Security Council Resolution 1574 (2004), 4 February
2005, UNDoc. S/2005/68; Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan Pursuant to Paragraph 15 of Security
Council Resolution 1564 (2004) and paragraphs 6, 13, and 16 of Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004) and
Paragraph 17 of Security Council Resolution 1574 (2004), 4 March 2005, UN Doc. S/2005/140; Report of the
Secretary-General on the Sudan Pursuant to Paragraph 15 of Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004) and
paragraphs 6, 13, and 16 of Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004) and Paragraph 17 of Security Council
Resolution 1574 (2004) 12 April 2005, UN Doc. S/2005/240.
12. Report of theUnitedNationsHighCommissioner forHumanRights and Follow-Up to theWorldConference
on Human Rights: Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur Region of the Sudan, 7 May 2004, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/3, para. 6.
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The government has consistently denied responsibility for the Janjaweed, al-
though most, if not all, observers do not ﬁnd their denials convincing.13 The gov-
ernment of Sudan accepts that violations of human rights and humanitarian law
haveoccurred, buthas asserted ‘that suchviolations represented individual excesses
rather than state policy, and that they were the natural, or inevitable, consequences
of an armed conﬂict which would end with the end of conﬂict’.14
Ceaseﬁres signed in 2004 have not served to end the conﬂict, which has led to
the death of at least 50,000 people (although the death toll may be approaching
200,000), 1.65 million internally displaced persons, and 2,000,000 refugees crossing
the border into Chad.15 The ﬁghting has been characterized by indiscriminate at-
tacks on civilians (including air attacks on villages), rape, looting, destruction of
property, torture (including partial skinnings), forced displacement by government
or Janjaweed forces, and, to a far lesser extent, looting, attacks on civilians, and the
use of child soldiers by rebel forces.16 The level of forced displacement has led to
a number of organizations declaring (probably rightly) that ‘ethnic cleansing’ has
taken place in Darfur,17 while the US Congress, perhaps mindful of the criticism
the United States received over its refusal to characterize the events in Rwanda as
genocide in a timely fashion, has stated that genocide is occurring there.18 Whether
the speciﬁc intent required for genocide on the part of the government as a whole
could be made out is controversial, but at the very least the actions amount to war
crimes and crimes against humanity on the part of the government,while the rebels
can plausibly be accused of war crimes.19
3. THE SECURITY COUNCIL REACTION
The activity of theUnitedNations, in particular the Security Council, in response to
the crisis in Darfur has followed a fairly familiar pattern. This pattern was set by its
actions inrelationtotheformerYugoslavia, andentrenchedsomewhatwithSecurity
Council resolutions on Rwanda. This pattern begins with expressions of concern or
condemnation, then further details of the actions are sought, then a commission
of investigation is created and prosecutions are ensured (in those instances by the
13. See, e.g., Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan: Emmanuel
Akwei Addo, 28 February 2005, E/CN.4/2005/11, paras. 33–35; Human RightsWatch,Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic
Cleansing by Government andMilitia Forces inWestern Sudan (2004), 42–9; International Crisis Group, ‘Darfur:
The Failure to Protect’, Africa Report No. 89, 2 March 2005, at 7.
14. Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 12, para. 46.
15. Report of the International Commission, supra note 7, para. 226.
16. Ibid., paras. 73–488.
17. Human Rights Watch, supra note 13, at 39–42; Human Rights Watch, ‘If We Return, We Will be Killed’:
Consolidation of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur, Sudan (2004).
18. House Concurrent Resolution 467, Senate Concurrent Resolution 133, 22 July 2004.
19. Report of the International Commission, supra note 7, paras. 73–564. For comment on the report see
C. Byron, ‘Commentary on the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations
Secretary-General’, (2005) 6 Human Rights Law Review 35; de Waal, supra note 7, at xviii–xix, thinks that
‘genocidal intent can be shown’.
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creation of ad hoc tribunals).20 As with the Yugoslavia and Rwanda actions, the
Security Council began quietly in April 2004, although this timewith a presidential
statement to the press (interestingly not a formal statement of the president) which
expressed ‘deep concern about the massive humanitarian crisis’ in Darfur.21 This
was criticized by onenon-governmental organization (NGO),HumanRightsWatch,
for not going far enough.22
The Security Council re-entered the fray in June 2004 with Security Council
Resolution 1547, which condemned ‘all acts of violence and violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law by all parties’.23 This was reiterated in
Resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004, which, despite condemning violence by all parties,
mentioned the Janjaweedspeciﬁcallyandcondemned ‘especially those [crimes]with
an ethnic dimension’. It also contained the ﬁrst reference to criminal responsibility
for such offences by ‘welcoming the commitment by the government of Sudan to
investigate the atrocities and prosecute those responsible.’24 This resolution was
adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, by determining that the situation in
Sudan was a threat to international peace and security. This determination allowed
the SecurityCouncil tomake express bindingdemands on theparties to the conﬂict.
Operative paragraph 6 of the resolution dealt with issues of criminal responsibility,
demanding that the government disarm the Janjaweed and ‘bring to justice Janja-
weed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out human rights
and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities’. To show that
the Council was serious about requiring such persons to be brought to justice, the
Council asked the Secretary-General to report everymonth on the fulﬁlment of the
obligations contained in that paragraph, ‘and express[ed] its intention to consider
further actions, including measures as provided for in Article 41 [of the Charter] . . .
in the event of non-compliance’.
3.1. The international commission
The pressurewas increased in September 2004 by Resolution 1564, which reiterated
the demand for the disarming and arrest of those responsible for atrocities, this
time naming not only the Janjaweed militias but also ‘popular defence forces’, and
requiring, again under Chapter VII, that the government pass to theAfricanUnion’s
Mission in Sudan documentation on who had been arrested. Again, action under
Article 41 of theCharterwas threatened. Concerns that Sudanhadnot lived up to its
obligations and that it was unlikely to do so led to one of the most important steps
being taken, again one that echoed the Council’s action in relation to Yugoslavia
20. See J. C. O’Brien, ‘The International Tribunal forViolations of InternationalHumanitarian Law in the Former
Yugoslavia’, (1993) 87 AJIL 639, at 639–42.
21. UN Press Release SC/8050, 2 April 2004. On the difference see S. Talmon, ‘The Statements by the President of
the Security Council’, (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 419, at 427–30.
22. Human RightsWatch, supra note 13, at 53.
23. 11 June 2004, UN Doc. S/RES/1547.
24. 30 July 2004, UN Doc. S/RES/1556.
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and Rwanda. This was to set up a commission of investigation.25 The commission’s
mandate was
to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human
rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide
have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violationswith a view to ensure
that those responsible are held accountable.26
The commissionwas set up inOctober 2004,when the Secretary-General appoin-
ted as its members Antonio Cassese, a past president of the ICTY, Mohamed Fayek,
the secretary-general of the Arab Organization for Human Rights and a former
Egyptian ForeignMinister, Hilana Jilani, the secretary-general of the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan, Dumisa Ntsebeza, a former member of the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and Therese Stringer-Scott, a member of the
SouthAfrican ‘GoldstoneCommission’anddiplomat.ThecommissionvisitedSudan
in November 2004 and January 2005, when it met the Sudanese government, rebel
forces, andNGOs. Someof the commission’smembers also visited theAfricanUnion
inAddisAbaba toobtain further information.Thecommissionoperatedasboth fact-
ﬁnder and appraiser, applying the law to the facts they found.27
The commission returned to the Secretary-General on 25 January 2005 with a
176-page report that showed the results of its investigations and made a number
of determinations. The most important ﬁndings were that acts amounting to war
crimes and crimes against humanity had occurred in Darfur. As mentioned above,
however, it determined that although some individuals may have acted with geno-
cidal intent, the governmenthadnot followedagenocidal policy inDarfur.28 Having
investigated the possibilities for bringing those responsible for international crimes
to justice, the commission recommended that the Security Council refer the situ-
ation in Darfur to the ICC, under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute,29 in which such
a referral is speciﬁcally contemplated. Article 13(b) gives the ICC jurisdiction, when
‘[a] situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed
is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations’, wherever it may be located. That provision was
included in the Rome Statute speciﬁcally to allow the Security Council to mandate
the ICC to act rather than set up new ad hoc tribunals itself.
The reasons givenby the commission in recommending a referral to the ICCwere
many. First, the commission based its recommendation on the understanding that
the offences threatened international peace and security. Second, the commission
averred that, since high-ranking state ofﬁcials were suspected of committing of-
fences, it would be difﬁcult or impossible to investigate them in Sudan, thus ‘resort
to the ICC, the only true institution of international criminal justice, would ensure
25. On Yugoslavia see SC Resolution 780, UN Doc. S/RES/780. On Rwanda see SC Resolution 935, UN Doc.
S/RES/935.
26. UN Doc. S/RES/1564.
27. This summary is based on Report of the International Commission, supra note 7, paras. 12–25.
28. Ibid., paras. 489–522.
29. Ibid., paras. 569–572. The Commission also suggested setting up a compensation commission (ibid., paras.
570, 591–603).
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that justice be done’, in particular because holding trials away from the locus delicti
‘might ensure a neutral atmosphere and prevent the trials from stirring up political,
ideological or other passions’. Third, the commission felt that the authority of the
ICC and the Security Councilmight persuade high-level offenders to submit to trial.
Their other reasonswere of amore procedural nature, being that the ICC ‘is the best
suited organ’ to ensure a fair trial, that it can be activated without delay, and that
its proceedings ‘would not necessarily involve a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial burden for the
international community’.30
The ﬁrst reason does not quite prove the point the commission seeks to make,
since thevastmajority of international crimes involve threats to international peace
and security, and the Rome Statute shows that even for such crimes as these the
primary forum for prosecution is still intended to be domestic courts. Some might
also doubt reasons two and three, on the basis that they adopt a rather optimistic
view of the situation and actors in Sudan. On the other hand, the experience of the
ICTYdoes give cause for hopeon these points; a number of high-level offenders have
surrendered to the ICTY and early protests against surrenders had largely ﬁzzled out
by the time Slobodan Milosˇevic´ was sent to The Hague. Equally, no two situations
are identical, andprotests in Sudanat the referral to the ICC,31 alongside the fact that
thereareoverlapsbetweenthe issuesandactors involved inthenorth–south/centre–
periphery conﬂict, and the (arguably centre–periphery) conﬂict in Darfur, militate
against any rush to optimism on these issues.
The commission did look at other possibilities for bringing people to justice. The
ﬁrst of thesewas touse thenational courts of Sudan.National courts, in particular as
laid down by the Rome Statute, should be the courts of ﬁrst resort for prosecution.32
However, as the commission noted, the failure by both rebels and the government
to take anymeaningful steps to prosecute individuals and the state of the Sudanese
justicesystemmeant that ‘theSudanesecourtsareunableandunwillingtoprosecute
and try the alleged offenders’.33 The choice of the terms ‘unable and unwilling’, and
perhaps their order, is very unlikely to be accidental, referring as they do to the two
situations when the ICC can trump domestic jurisdictions pursuant to Article 17 of
the Rome Statute.
The other three options involved some international element to prosecution;
none,however,wasconsideredadvisable forSudan.TheﬁrstwasaUSsuggestion: the
creation of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal along the lines of the ICTY and
the ICTR.Thiswasbecause theUnitedStateswouldratherpay for suchan institution
than grant any legitimacy to the ICC (it must be remembered that the decision on
the forum for trial of international crimes can be as political as the decision to turn
to prosecution itself). The commission took the view that such a tribunal, if the
30. Ibid., para. 572.
31. See, e.g., BBC News, ‘UN Sets Darfur Trials in Motion’, 5 April 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/africa/4411497.stm.
32. See M. Arsanjani, ‘The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court’, (1999) 93 AJIL 22, 24–5.
33. Report of the International Commission, supra note 7, para. 568.
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ICTY and ICTR are any guides, would be expensive and slow to prosecute.34 This is
almost certainly true, although it is interesting to see a commission headed by the
ﬁrst president of one of those bodies admitting their shortcomings so candidly.
The next option was to expand the roles of one of the existing ad hoc tribunals.
The commission rejected this for the same reasons, adding that the tribunals were
already ‘overstretched, for theyareworkingveryhard to implement the “completion
strategy” elaborated and approved by the Security Council’ under US pressure.35
The commission also noted that attempting to get one of the tribunals to change
its priorities at this stage would cause confusion.36 This is almost certainly correct;
the completion strategies are controversial enough as it is,37 and to require one or
the other of the ad hoc tribunals to change its focus at this time would be difﬁcult.
To take but a small example, the whole question of how, or if, the composition
of the translation units could be altered or expanded to deal with a profusion of
relevant languages would be hugely difﬁcult. Over and above the multitudinous
administrative issues that would arise if this optionwere to be chosen, the length of
timeneededtoinvestigatetheDarfursituationandthentoprosecutewouldcertainly
conﬂict with the completion strategy which required that all investigations by the
tribunals be completed by the end of 2004 and that all ﬁrst-instance trials be over by
2008.38
The ﬁnal option rejected by the commission was the possibility of setting up a
mixed court, along the lines of those in East Timor or Sierra Leone,39 thus involving
both international and Sudanese judges. The commission decided that this would
be inappropriate, partly on the basis of the experience of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, which, ‘with its voluntary contributions, is hardly coping with the
demands of justice there’.40 The sources of funding for the Special Court were
controversial from the start,41 and its small budget has unquestionably hobbled it
in terms of adopting a broad-based programme of accountability. Creating another
new court would also be a lengthy process, since it would necessitate negotiating
an agreement with the government of Sudan.42 The commission also noted that
34. Ibid., para. 574. For earlier comments on theprohibitive costs of new international criminal tribunals seeD. J.
Scheffer, ‘International Judicial Intervention’, (1996) 102 Foreign Policy 34, at 49.Michael Scharf took the view
that one of the underlying causes of ‘tribunal fatigue’ is the cost: M. P. Scharf, ‘The Politics of Establishing
an International Criminal Court’, (1995) 6 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law. 167, 170. The
Commission took a similar view (ibid.).
35. Report of the International Commission, supra note 7, para. 575.
36. Ibid.
37. See, e.g., D. Raab, ‘Evaluating the ICTY and Its Completion Strategy’, (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 82; L. Coˆte´, ‘Reﬂections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law’,
(2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 162, 185–6.
38. Security Council Resolution 1503 UNDoc. S/RES/1503, 28 Aug. 2003.
39. On which see C. Romano, A. Nollkaemper, and J. K. Kleffner (eds.), Internationalized Criminal Courts (2004).
40. Report of the International Commission, supra note 7, para. 578.
41. See R. Cryer, ‘A Special Court for Sierra Leone?’, (2001) 50 International and Comparative LawQuarterly 435, at
438–9.
42. Report of the International Commission, supra note 7, para. 578. Although the commission is diplomatic
enough not to be explicit about this, it is almost certain that it had inmind the possibility of bad faith on the
part of the government of Sudan, recalling the interminable political problems that bedevilled negotiations
between the UN and Cambodia for mixed tribunals. See D. K. Donovan, ‘Joint UN–Cambodia Efforts to
Establish a Khmer Rouge Tribunal’, (2003) 44Harvard International Law Journal 551.
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owing to the political situation in Sudan, it would be dangerous for national judges
to sit in judgement on high government ofﬁcials. Also, Sudanese criminal law and
procedure is incompatible with human rights law, therefore the mixed-jurisdiction
model would be inappropriate.43 This again is correct; the UN ought not to involve
itself with trials that are not up to international standards.44
What is interesting about the commission’s discussion of these options is what
they show about building a body of empirical knowledge on how to prosecute
international crimes and the pitfalls of the various mechanisms for ensuring ac-
countability. To some extent the ICTY and the ICTR, and certainly themixed courts,
were experiments in international criminal justice.45 When they were set up it was
by no means clear what the advantages and disadvantages of each option were. It
is too early to come to a ﬁnal conclusion on the efﬁcacy of the tribunals, but the
evidence is now becoming clearer, showing the positive and negative aspects of
the various forums for trial. This perhaps shows that international criminal law is
becoming amature discipline, responding to Koskenniemi’s criticism of institution
building that it is too often based on supposition or derivation from vague general
principles – such as ‘democracy’ or ‘civilization’ – rather than empirical research.46
This, in itself, represents a positive development.
3.2. Resolution 1593
The Security Council, over the hard-negotiated abstentions from the veto of the US
and China, and the abstentions (for very different reasons) of Algeria and Brazil,
ﬁnally decided at the end of March 2005 in Resolution 1593 to refer the situation in
Darfur to the ICC.47 This was achieved by operative paragraph 1 of the Resolution,
which stated that theSecurityCouncil ‘Decides to refer the situation inDarfur since1
July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court’ (italics in original).
The referral waswelcomed bymany as a victory for international criminal justice.48
When theRomeStatute includedprovisionsdealingwithSecurityCouncil referrals,
most commentators probably took the view that, given the antipathy to the Court
of at least two members of the Security Council (the United States and China),
43. Report of the International Commission, supra note 7, paras. 579–80.
44. SeeR.Cryer, ‘Post-Conﬂict Justice,AMatter of Judgment, Practice or Principle?’, inN.D.White andD.Klaasen
(eds.), The UN, Human Rights and Post-Conﬂict Situations (2005), 267, at 288.
45. See S. Linton, ‘Cambodia, East Timor, Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Criminal Justice’, (2001) 12
Criminal Law Forum 185.
46. Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 178.
47. 31March 2005, UNDoc. S/RES/1593. The Resolution thus passed 10–0–4.
48. See, e.g.,UNPressReleaseSG/SM/9797/AFR/1132, ‘Secretary-GeneralWelcomesAdoptionofSecurityCouncil
Resolution Referring Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to International Criminal Court Prosecutor’. See also the
press releases from the Darfur Consortium, ‘A New Hope for Justice in Sudan’; Parliamentarians for Global
Action, ‘Darfur: International Parliamentary GroupWelcomes United Nations Security Council Resolution
1593 and Urges All States to Fully Cooperate with the International Criminal Court’; Arab Coalition for
the International Criminal Court, ‘Arab Coalition for the International Criminal Court Welcomes Security
Council Resolution 1593 on Crimes Committed in Darfur’; International Center for Transitional Justice,
‘SecurityCouncil Referral to ICCOffersHope forDarfurVictims’; HumanRights First, ‘UNTakes Steps to End
HumanRights Crisis inDarfur, But Immediate Action Is Required: USDeserves Credit for Leadership Role on
Darfur’; Amnesty International, ‘Sudan: Historic Referral to ICC Tarnished by Exemptions’; Human Rights
Watch, ‘UNSecurityCouncil RefersDarfur to the ICC’; Citizens forGlobal Solutions, ‘US Puts PrinciplesOver
Politics’. All available at http://www.iccnow.org.
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the Security Council was highly unlikely to refer any situations to the ICC49 and,
indeed, that nearly happened. The United States was extremely unwilling to pass
the matter to the ICC. Its opposition was emphatically stated by its representative
at the Security Council when Resolution 1593 was adopted:
Althoughweabstainedon this SecurityCouncil Resolution referral to the ICC,wehave
not dropped, and indeed continue to maintain our long-standing and ﬁrm objections
and concerns regarding the ICC. We believe that the Rome Statute is ﬂawed and does
not have sufﬁcient protections from the possibility of politicized prosecutions. We
reiterate our fundamental objection to the Rome Statute’s assertions that the ICC has
jurisdiction over the nationals, including government ofﬁcials, of States that have not
become parties to the Rome Statute.50
Legally, the United States’ views are easily refutable.51 However, the legal argu-
ments are the superstructure of the United States’ political opposition,52 and given
the US position in international affairs it is able to make its opposition felt as
well as known. As a quid pro quo for its abstention, the United States insisted on
three things, the ﬁrst being that no funding would be forthcoming from the UN for
the costs of the investigations in Darfur. We will return to the lawfulness of this
presently. From a pragmatic point of view, however, Canada has stepped in with a
US$500,000 voluntary contribution to the ICC to assist it with its investigations in
Darfur.53
The second demand made by the United States was that the resolution make
reference to the (controversial) bilateral immunity agreements that it has made
with a number of countries.54 As a result the preamble of Resolution 1593 stated
that it was ‘taking note of the existence of agreements referred to in Article 98(2) of
the Rome Statute’. The United States expressed appreciation that Resolution 1593
noted those agreements,55 which was probably because that country considers that
the resolution thus entrenches and provides some legitimacy for such agreements.
The fact that the preamble provides as it does might be taken to imply that such
49. See, e.g., B. Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule
of Law (2003), 79.
50. UN Doc. S/PV.5158, at 3 (Mrs Patterson). Those fearing politicization might note, from the other end, that
Patterson declared her satisfaction that ‘we expect that, by having the Security Council refer the situation
on Darfur to the ICC, ﬁrm political oversight of the process will be exercised’ (ibid.).
51. On theUS position seeD. J. Scheffer, ‘TheUnited States and the International Criminal Court’, (1999) 93AJIL
12; R.Wedgwood, ‘The International Criminal Court: AnAmericanView’ (1999) 10 EJIL 93. In refutation see,
inter alia, G. Hafner, K. Boon, A. Ru¨besame, and J. Houtson, ‘A Response to the American View as Presented by
RuthWedgwood’, (1999) 10 EJIL 108; B. S. Brown, ‘U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Brief Response’, (1999) 31 New York University Journal of International Law & Politics 855; M. Leigh,
‘The United States and the Statute of Rome’, (2001) 95 AJIL 124.
52. SeeD. Forsythe, ‘TheUnited States and International Criminal Justice’, (2002) 24HumanRights Quarterly 974,
at 974.
53. Canada Foreign Affairs, ‘Canada Contributes $500000 to International Criminal Court for Darfur Invest-
igations’, Press Release, 4 April 2005, No. 58. Voluntary Contributions are permitted under Art. 116 of the
Rome Statute. At a general level such contributions do raise spectres of possible political inﬂuence. See,
e.g., Prosecutor v. Norman, Decision on the Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Judicial In-
dependence) SCSL-2004–14-AR72(E) 13 March 2004. As the Special Court for Sierra Leone noted, however,
the provision of funding does not, per se, equate to partiality; ibid., paras 24–43. In this particular instance,
the Canadian donation appears to have been on idealistic grounds. No Canadian nationals have been even
remotely connected to the crimes in Darfur that have been referred to the ICC.
54. On which see R. Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime
(2005), 154–5.
55. UN Doc. S/PV.5158, at 4 (Mrs Patterson).
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agreements are consistent with the Rome Statute. However, two other members
of the Council attempted to limit the impact of this statement. Ellen Margrethe
Løj, Denmark’s permanent representative, noted that ‘As regards the formulation
regarding the existence of the agreements referred to in Article 98 paragraph 2
of the Rome Statute, Denmark would like to stress that the reference is purely
factual; it ismerely referring to the existence of such agreements. Thus the reference
in no way impinges on the integrity of the Rome Statute.’56 Brazil went further,
with its permanent representative, RonaldoMota Sardenberg, explaining his state’s
abstention on Resolution 1593 on the basis that the preamble referred to such
agreements, and ‘My delegation has difﬁculty in supporting a reference that not
only does not favour the ﬁght against impunity but also stresses a provision whose
application is a controversial issue.’57
This was an important issue, but not one of massive practical importance in
relation to the situation in Darfur. The same might be said in relation to the ﬁnal
compromise required by the United States: the inclusion of operative paragraph 6.
That paragraph
Decides thatnationals, currentor formerofﬁcials orpersonnel fromacontributingState
outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all
alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established or
authorized by the Council or the AfricanUnion, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has
been expressly waived by that State.
Quite serious questions may be raised, and were raised, about this on the basis
of its compliance with basic principles of the rule of law, to which we shall return.
Before that, however, it is advisable to look in some depth at the lawfulness of the
resolution. The actions of the Security Council in relation to the ICC have already
proved controversial,58 and Resolution 1593 is no exception. Lawfulness ought to
precede legitimacy in debate, not least on the basis that the lawful or otherwise
nature of an action has an important effect on its legitimacy.59
4. THE UN CHARTER, THE ROME STATUTE
AND RESOLUTION 1593
Aswe saw above, it is unquestionable that the Security Councilmay lawfully refer a
situation to the ICC under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. The better view is also
56. Ibid., at 6 (Ms Løj).
57. Ibid., at 11 (Mr Sanderberg).
58. See, e.g., C. Stahn, ‘The Ambiguities of Resolution 1422’, (2003) 14 EJIL 85; M. Weller, ‘Undoing the Global
Constitution:UNSecurityCouncilActiononthe InternationalCriminalCourt’, (2002)78 InternationalAffairs
693; D. McGoldrick, ‘Political and Legal Responses to the ICC’, in D. McGoldrick, P. Rowe, and E. Donnelly
(eds.), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (2003), 389, at 415–22; N. Jain, ‘A
Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash Between the Security Council and the International Criminal
Court’, (2005) 16 EJIL 239. See also R. Cryer and N. D. White, ‘The Security Council and the International
Criminal Court: Who’s Feeling Threatened?’, (2002) 8 International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International
Peace Operations 143.
59. Foranexcellentcritiqueofclaims thatactivity is ‘illegalbut legitimate’ seeB.Roth, ‘Bending theLaw,Breaking
It, or Developing It? The United States and the Humanitarian Use of Force in the Post-Cold-War Era’, in
G. Nolte and M. Byers (eds.), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (2003), 232, at
250–6.
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(although somemight question this) that such a referral represented the best option
for the Security Council. However, as we shall see, the Council cannot simply use
the ICC as its sees ﬁt. The Council is bound by the UN Charter, and the ICC, as an
independent judicial body, must act according to its Statute, not simply in the way
in which the Council would like it to.
4.1. Financing the referral
An issue that has had an important, if perhaps overlooked, role in international
criminal lawis thatofﬁnance.60 Therequirement inResolution1593thatno funding
for the investigation into theDarfur situation shall come from theUNhas a perilous
relationship with Article 115 of the Rome Statute,61 which provides that
The expenses of the Court and the Assembly of States Parties, including its Bureau
and subsidiary bodies, as provided for in the budget decided by the Assembly of States
Parties, shall be provided by the following sources:
. . .
(b) Funds provided by the United Nations, subject to the approval of the General
Assembly, in particular in relation to the expenses incurred due to referrals by the
Security Council.
There is little doubt that the intention of this provisionwas to ensure that theUN
paid for referrals that itmade to the ICC.Otherwise theUNwould be able to allocate
its costs to the ICC, and thus indirectly to the Rome Statute’s states parties. One
need not be a member of the law and economics movement to see that this aspect
of Resolution 1593 is problematic. As William Schabas has noted in the context of
Article 115, ‘specialmention ismade of expenses thatmay be incurred in the case of
Security Council referrals, for which it seems only natural that the United Nations
must be responsible’.62 It is true that the UN is not formally bound by the Rome
Statute, since it is not a party, but the point that theUN should not be able to redirect
the costs of the activities of its organs (in this case the Security Council) remains.
The problems with this aspect of Resolution 1593 go a little deeper. There are
UN constitutional matters at issue here. The General Assembly, not the Security
Council, has authority over UN budgetary matters. By virtue of Article 17 of the
UNCharter,63 exclusive authority over budgetarymatters is reserved to the General
Assembly, the only area in which the General Assembly has mandatory powers
over the membership of the UN. It is questionable whether the Security Council
60. In the not underwritten world of international criminal law, there is still considerable room for studies of
the impact of economic considerations on decision-making in the area. Two particular areas that spring to
mind are how trading partners of states whose ofﬁcials are suspected of international crimes and voluntary
contributors to the coffers of international criminal tribunals inﬂuence decisions on whether to prosecute.
61. SeeM.Halff andD.Tolbert, ‘Article115’, inO.Triffterer (ed.),Commentaryon theRomeStatute for the International
Criminal Court (1999), 1221, at 1227–8.
62. W. A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2001), 159. See similarly L. Condorelli and
S. Villalpando, ‘Referral and Deferral by the Security Council’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. R. W. D. Jones
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002), 627, at 643–4.
63. On which see W. Koschorrek, ‘Article 17’, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary
(2003), 332. OnUN fundingmore generally see E. J. Ca´rdenas, ‘UN Funding: Some Reﬂections’, (2000) 11 EJIL
67.
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can pre-empt the General Assembly’s competence in this way by demanding that
the Assembly not provide any money for the expenses related to a referral. The
Negotiated Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United
Nationsmakes it clear that the decisionon theprovisionof funding to the ICCunder
Article 115 is the General Assembly’s.64
On the last occasion when the Security Council attempted to fetter the General
Assembly’sdiscretion,whentheCouncilpurported todetermine inResolution82765
that theICTYbefundedfromthegeneral, rather thanthepeacekeeping,budgetof the
UN, a row ensued in which the Council came off second best.66 It may legitimately
be inferred fromboth theCharter and this event that the SecurityCouncil is not able
to pre-empt the judgment of theGeneralAssembly onbudgetarymeasures,whether
under Chapter VII or not. It may be, however, that Resolution 1593 will not become
as divisive an issue in the Assembly as Resolution 827. After all, Resolution 1593,
unlike Resolution 827, does not impose any additional ﬁnancial burdens on the UN
overall or necessitateGeneralAssembly action.AlsoCanada’s kinddecision tomake
agrant to at least someof the costs the ICCwill incur in relation to theDarfur referral
may make the situation in practice more palatable for the ICC.67 Whether the ICC
ought to concede the principle that the Security Council can use it as a free good is
another question.
Equally, the General Assembly is jealous of its competence in ﬁnancial matters.
As the Certain Expenses opinion showed, ﬁnance at the UN is a matter of high, as
well as low, politics.68 Resolution 1593 was accompanied by a rather provocative
statement from the US acting permanent representative, Anne Patterson, that
We are pleased that the resolution recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in
connection with the referral will be borne by the United Nations . . . This principle
is extremely important and we want to be clear that any effort to retrench on that
principle by this or other organizations to which we contribute could result in our
withholding funding or taking other action in response.69
It is difﬁcult to read this as anything other than a veiled threat to the General
Assembly: should it decide to provide funding to the ICC, Resolution 1593 notwith-
standing, the United States may return to the refusal to pay its UN dues that caused
such difﬁculty for theUN in the 1990s.70 Such a result would be deeply unwelcome.
On the other hand, to allow the Security Council to dictate questions of funding
would represent a considerable transfer of authority to the Security Council outside
any Charter authority, and possibly give rise to the question ofwhether the Security
64. Art. 13 of theAgreement reads, ‘TheUnitedNations and theCourt agree that the conditions underwhich any
funds may be provided to the Court by a decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations pursuant
to Article 115 shall be subject of separate arrangements’. Negotiated Relationship Agreement Between the
International Criminal Court and the United Nations. The point is not the separate agreements (which do
not yet exist), but the agreement that ﬁnancing is the Assembly’s business.
65. 25May 1993, UNDoc. S/RES/827.
66. On this see V. Morris andM. P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1998), 677–8.
67. It is a matter of speculation whether Canada had made its willingness to contribute to the cost of the
investigations known prior to the passage of Resolution 1593.
68. Certain Expenses of the United NationsOpinion, [1962] ICJ Rep. 151.
69. UN Doc. S/PV.5158, at 4 (Mrs Patterson).
70. On which see J. F. Murphy, The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs (2004), ch. 3.
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Council and General Assembly could be seen as equally primary organs of the UN
in anything other than name.
4.2. Operative paragraph 6
The most controversial aspect of the referral in 1593 was operative paragraph 6.71
This paragraph granted exclusive jurisdiction to contributing states not party to the
Rome Statute in relation to their ‘nationals, current or former ofﬁcials or personnel’
unless they were Sudanese. However, it is not entirely clear what the basis of the
jurisdictional limitation in operative paragraph 6 is. Given the ambiguity, it is
worth looking at past exampleswhere the SecurityCouncil has demanded exclusive
jurisdiction.
The Security Council expressly required exclusive jurisdiction for peacekeepers
and related personnel in relation to the Special Court of Sierra Leone and under
Security Council Resolution 1497. When the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone was being drafted, the president of the Security Council wrote to the UN
Secretary-General insisting on provisions that kept primary jurisdiction in those
states who had sent peacekeepers or related persons to Sierra Leone with Sierra
Leonean consent, whether or not there was a status of forces agreement for the
personnel.72 The Special Court was only to be able to exercise jurisdiction over
those people if the home jurisdiction was unwilling or unable to do so, and the
Security Council adopted a positive resolution permitting the Court to act in those
instances.73 This positionmight be defended on the basis that the agreement bound
only Sierra Leone and it consented to this waiver of its jurisdiction.
The same cannot be said with respect to Resolution 1497.74 Resolution 1497
related to the setting up in 2003 of a multinational force to support the ceaseﬁre
in Liberia. Operative paragraph 7 of Resolution 1497, included at the insistence of
the United States, is clearly an inspiration for its counterpart in Resolution 1593.
Operative paragraph 7
Decides that current or former ofﬁcials or personnel from a contributing State, which
is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, shall be subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions
arisingoutofor related to theMultinationalForce . . .unless suchexclusive jurisdiction
has been expressly waived by that contributing State.
During the passage of that resolution, a number of states expressed doubt about
the compatibility of operative paragraph 7with the Rome Statute and general inter-
national law. The two states that were clearest about their opposition to operative
paragraph 7 were Germany and France.75 Germany expressed its concerns that
71. Its legitimacy is dealt with below, at note 104 et seq. and accompanying text.
72. Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General, 22 December 2000, UN Doc.
S/2000/1234. The requirement was adopted in Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, Art. 1(b).
73. Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, Art. 1(c).
74. 1 August 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1497.
75. AlthoughMexiconoted itsconcerns inrelationto ‘principlesof international law’, its statementconcentrated
primarily on Mexican constitutional law. UN Doc. S/PV.4803, 2–3 (Mr Aguilar Zinser). Chile expressed its
concern that ‘by making exceptions, we might impede the harmonious development of international law’,
UN Doc. S/PV.4803, at 6 (MrMun˜oz).
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operative paragraph 7 would prohibit the use of passive personality or universal
jurisdiction.76 It also appears that Germany was uncomfortable with the relation-
ship between operative paragraph 7 and the Rome Statute, mentioning it alongside
its fears about national jurisdiction.77 France’s commentswere the clearest, explain-
ing that ‘Wedonotbelieve that the scopeof the jurisdictional immunity thuscreated
is compatible with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.’78
None of the critics of the Resolution explained precisely why they considered
operative paragraph 7 inconsistent with the Rome Statute, but the most likely
reason is that although the Rome Statute gives the Security Council the right to
request the Prosecutor to defer investigations into a situation for a period of a year
pursuant to Article 16,79 operative paragraph 7 seeks to have a permanent effect.
The drafters of the Rome Statute were unwilling to grant the Security Council the
authority permanently to limit the ICC’s action in one fell swoop. Whether the
Security Council has the right to do so outside the provisions of the Rome Statute is
doubtful, to say the least.80
4.2.1. The nature of operative paragraph 6
There are three possible ways of interpreting operative paragraph 6 which are
referable, at least to some extent, to provisions of the Rome Statute. The ﬁrst would
be to see Resolution 1593 as the Security Council referring the situation in Darfur
to the ICC under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, but simultaneously issuing a
(binding) request to the ICC under Article 16 that the Prosecutor not investigate
nationals of non-party states outside Sudan. Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides
that
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted
under Chapter VII of theCharter of theUnitedNations, has requested theCourt to that
effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.
In favour of this interpretation the preamble of Resolution 1593maybe prayed in
aid. Preambular paragraph 2 of Resolution 1593 speciﬁcally recalls Article 16 of the
Rome Statute. A highly charitable reading of this, therefore, would be that operative
paragraph 6 is simply a request under Article 16, which would expire on 30 March
2006, after which the Prosecutor could investigate the personnel mentioned in that
paragraph.
76. UN Doc. S/PV.4803, 4 (Mr Plueger). France may have agreed, noting alongside its concerns about the Rome
Statute that it did not believe that operative paragraph 7 was compatible with ‘principles of international
law’ without further explanation, UNDoc. S/PV.4803, at 7 (Mr Duclos).
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid., at 7 (Mr Duclos).
79. See generally L. Yee, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles 13(b) and 16’, in
R. S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (1999), 149; M. Bergsmo and
J. Pejic´, ‘Article 16’, in Triffterer, supra note 61, at 373.
80. See infra notes 95–9 and accompanying text. See also Cryer and White, supra note 58, at 153–4. There is a
possible hint that it might have such authority in F. Berman, ‘The Relationship between the International
CriminalCourt and theSecurityCouncil’, inH.A.M.vonHebel, J. Lammers, and J. Schukking (eds.),Reﬂections
on the International Criminal Court (1999), 173, at 176–8.
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The second way of seeing operative paragraph 6 is that it reﬂects the Security
Council’s wish to refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC except insofar as it regards
personnel of non-state parties. In favour of this interpretation is the wording of
operative paragraph 6 itself, which does not request the prosecutor to defer invest-
igations for a year, as per Article 16 of the Rome Statute, but declares that those
personnel are in the exclusive jurisdiction of their sending state. We will return to
this interpretation at some length later.
The third way of seeing operative paragraph 6 is that it is an application of
bilateral non-surrender agreements to the situation. In other words, because of
preambular paragraph 4’s taking note of such agreements, and the exclusion of
jurisdiction being limited tonon-states parties,81 Resolution 1593 simply recognizes
those agreements. This is the least convincing of theways of seeing Resolution 1593
alongside the Rome Statute. As mentioned above, the resolution merely takes note
of the agreements. Also, it refers to all non-parties to the Rome Statute, not simply
to those with non-surrender agreements. Finally, as the Rome Statute makes clear,
even where lawful, the agreements do not exclude the jurisdiction of the ICC,82 but
preclude co-operation with the ICC where there is opposition of a party to such an
agreement to the surrender of their national to the ICC. Operative paragraph 6 is
framed in terms of an exclusion of jurisdiction, not a recognition of a right not to
co-operate.
Either of the two more plausible ways of approaching operative paragraph 6
canvassed above involve legal problems for different, albeit cognate, reasons. To see
Resolution 1593 as being an Article 13(b) referral, combined with a request under
Article 16 of the Rome Statute not to investigate peacekeepers who are non-party
nationals, is not necessarily in accordance with Article 16. It could be argued that
the Security Council can only prevent the ICC dealing with a ‘situation’ under
Article 16, rather than individuals, or groups of individuals. However, Article 16
does not refer to a situation, but to an ‘investigation’ or ‘prosecution’. Probably the
former, and certainly the latter, term clearly implies that the Security Council can
request deferral of particular investigations or prosecutions.83 Therefore itmight be
thought that the Security Council was simply exercising this power. However, there
are problems with this view.
The ﬁrst difﬁculty is the clearest; the language of the Resolution simply does
not support this interpretation. As mentioned above, operative paragraph 6 is not
framed in terms of Article 16.Where the Security Council has previously purported
81. Agreements between states parties to not surrender may not be acceptable under the Rome Statute, and
anyway, the ICC could order the surrender of the person from his or her home jurisdiction in such a
situation.
82. Art. 27of theRomeStatutemakes it very clear that thequestionofpersonal or State immunities are irrelevant
when a person is before the ICC. The somewhat Delphic, and controversial, judgment in the Yerodia case
was prepared to accept that immunities do not apply before international courts. Case Concerning the Arrest
Warrant of 11April 2000 (DemocraticRepublic ofCongo v. Belgium), ICJGeneral List 121, para. 60.On thedecision
see S.Wirth, ‘Immunity for CoreCrimes? The ICJ’s Judgment in theCongo v. BelgiumCase’, (2002) 13 EJIL 877;
C.Wickremasinghe, ‘ArrestWarrant of 11April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Preliminary
Objections andMerits, Judgment of 14 February 2002’, (2003) 52 International and Comparative LawQuarterly
775.
83. See, e.g., Bergsmo and Pejic´, supra note 79, at 378–9; Condorelli and Villalpando, supra note 62, at 647.
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to rely on Article 16, such as in Resolutions 1422 and 1487, it has expressly said
so in the relevant operative paragraph. Resolution 1593 does not. The only possible
support for suchaninterpretationis thepreambular referencetoArticle16,yet this is
undermined by thewording of operative paragraph 6. Not only does that paragraph
not refer to Article 16, but it frames itself in terms of a limitation of the jurisdiction
of the Court. The language of Resolution 1593 is far closer to the controversial
Resolution 1497 than to the (in other ways equally controversial) Resolution 1422.
Still, it isnot impossible that theSecurityCouncil could relyonArticle16without
expressly referring to it.84 The question is whether the intention of the Council can
be shown to have been to rely on that Article.85 None of the statements in the
Security Council invoked Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Almost all the comments
that dealt with the matter questioned the consistency of Resolution 1593 with the
Rome Statute.
Even if thiswere not the case, operative paragraph 6 is not consistentwithArticle
16oftheRomeStatute.Article16requirestheICCtodefertoarequestforatemporally
limited period. It is quite clear that there is no such temporal limitation envisaged in
Resolution1593,whichcontainsno ‘sunsetclause’ foroperativeparagraph6.Further
than this, Luigi Condorelli and Santiago Villalpando suggest that there are further
conditions to a Security Council request under Article 16. These are that there is a
threat to internationalpeaceandsecurity, as requiredbyArticle39of theUNCharter,
and that theCouncil has demonstrated that the deferral is ameans ofmaintainingor
restoring international peace and security.86 On the ﬁrst point, the Security Council
determined that the situation inDarfur amounted to a threat to international peace
and security, and there isno reason toquestion thatdetermination.87Morequestions
could be asked about the second determination, that the immunity granted was
demonstrably in the interests of international peace and security. Considerable
doubts may be expressed about whether such a demonstration took place. Equally,
this may be amatter which is simply within the broad discretionary competence of
theCouncil to determinewhat is in the interests of international peace and security.
Let us now turn to the other possible interpretation of Resolution 1593, that it
amounts to a referral to the ICC under Article 13(b), but the situation referred is
the situation in Darfur minus the activities of peacekeepers and related personnel.
There are considerable problems with this interpretation, both from the legal and
principled point of view. The primary difﬁculty in seeing operative paragraph 6 as
being consistent with the Rome Statute comes from the concept of a ‘situation’.
84. A resolution that requested the Prosecutor to defer investigations in a particular situation, but not expressly
invoking Art. 16, should not, for that reason alone, be considered not to be valid. Equally, when important
issues are at stake, it is not acceptable to infer a great deal from ambiguous passages in such resolutions; see
V. Lowe, ‘The Iraq Crisis:What Now?’, (2003) 52 International and Comparative LawQuarterly 859, at 866. This
ought not to be taken as claiming that the issue of immunity of peacekeepers is as important as going towar.
It is not.
85. On the question of the intention of the Security Council see N. D. White, ‘The Will and Authority of the
United Nations after Iraq’, (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of International Law 645.
86. Condorelli andVallalpando, supranote 62, at 646–7; see similarly (on theﬁrst point at least) Cryer andWhite,
supra note 58, at 155–8.
87. See, e.g., Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1564, referred to above.
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There are two views about the scope of a ‘situation’ in the Rome Statute. They
are that a ‘situation’ is appropriately limited solely by temporal or geographical
considerations, and that the referral of a situation may also include limitations
ratione personae. The most prominent proponent of the latter view of the concept of
a ‘situation’ is the former head of the US delegation to Rome, David Scheffer. In a
piece intended to win over US critics of the ICC, Scheffer averred that
The power of the Security Council to refer situations enables the Council to shape
the ICC’s jurisdiction . . . such referral can be tailored to minimise the exposure to
ICC jurisdiction of military forces deployed to confront the threat. The Chapter VII
resolution would deﬁne the parameters of the Court’s investigations in the particular
situation.88
This view is unpersuasive.89 The text of Article 13(b), in particular when read
alongside Article 16, makes it clear that a situation may not be limited ratione
personae. Article 13(b) reads, in relevant part, ‘a situation in which one or more of
such crimes appears to have been committed’. The original ILC draft Statute for
an International Criminal Court provided that the Council could refer ‘matters’ to
the Court, to avoid the impression that the Security Council could refer individual
cases.90 Theﬁnal versionofArticle 13(b) refers to ‘situations’ rather than ‘matters’, as
the former termwasmoregeneral than the latter.91 The terminologyof ‘situations’ is
clearly distinct from ‘prosecution’, whichwas used in Article 16, where the Council
was given the authority to intervene inmore speciﬁc cases.92 If theCouncil can only
refer situations, rather than ‘investigations’, ‘prosecutions’, and, a fortiori, ‘cases’,
then it cannot limit the referral, even by excluding a small group.
The fact that a situation may not be limited ratione personae also appears to
have been the position adopted by the Prosecutor. When Uganda ﬁrst sought to
refer itself to the ICC under Article 13(a) of the Rome Statute, the referral was for
the situation ‘concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army’ in northern Uganda.93 The
Prosecutor, nonetheless, has opened an investigation into northern Uganda more
generally.94 Article 13(a), like 13(b), refers to ‘situations’, and there is no reason to
believe that ‘situations’ was not intended to mean the same thing in both Article
13(a) and Article 13(b).
The ﬁnal way of seeing Resolution 1593 does not involve reference to the Rome
Statute. This is to take the language of operative paragraph 6 as creating exclusive
jurisdiction, thus ousting the jurisdiction of states and the ICC, or, perhaps, just the
88. D. J. Scheffer, ‘Staying the Course With the International Criminal Court’, (2001–2) 35 Cornell International
Law Journal 47, at 90.
89. See alsoDan Sarooshi, ‘The Peace and Justice Paradox: The International Criminal Court and theUNSecurity
Council’, in McGoldrick et al., supra note 58, 95–8.
90. Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court, in Report of the International Law Commission on the
Workof itsForty-SixthSession,UNDoc.A/49/10),Art. 23.SeeV.Gowlland-Debbas, ‘TheRelationshipbetween
the Security Council and the Projected International Criminal Court’, (1998) 3 Journal of Armed Conﬂict Law
97, at 102–3.
91. See S. A. Williams, ‘Article 13’, in Triffterer, supra note 61, at 343, 349. The drafting history thus confounds
the suggestion that the Council could refer a speciﬁc case by Condorelli and Villalpando, supra note 62, at
632–3. The Council could refer the situation, but not the case per se.
92. Although the Council is also entitled to intervenemore broadly into an ‘investigation’, the point remains.
93. ICC Press Release, 29 January 2004.
94. ICC Press Release, 29 July 2004.
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ICC.95 Not only would accepting Resolution 1593 as limiting the jurisdiction of the
Court involve, as we shall see, an alteration of the concept of ‘situation’ in Article
13(b), but it would also require the ICC to ignore Article 1 of the Rome Statute,
which reads, ‘The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by
the provisions of this Statute.’ There is simply no evidence that there is a general
right of the Security Council to require an international person to alter or avoid
its international legal obligations not referable to Article 103 of the UN Charter.96
Whether the Security Council can exclude state jurisdiction under Article 103 is
controversial, as Resolution 1497 showed. Irrespective ofwhether or not itmay alter
state rights, or a treaty between member states or between the UN and a member
state,97 the Security Council does not have the authority to alter the Rome Statute.
The ICC is a separate international person to its members and is not a party to the
UNCharter; therefore it is not boundby the trumpingprovision contained inArticle
103 of the Charter.98
The case for the proposition that the Council cannot alter the Rome Statute
is bolstered by the relationship agreement, which was signed by representatives
of the ICC and the UN and entered into force in October 2004. In Article 2(1) of
the agreement the UN ‘recognises the Court as an independent permanent judi-
cial institution which . . . has international legal personality’. In Article 2(2) ‘the
Court recognises the responsibilities of the United Nations under the Charter’.
Article 2(3) declares, as the last of the principles in the Article, ‘The United Na-
tions and the Court respect each other’s status and mandate.’ Despite the recog-
nition of the UN’s responsibilities under the Charter, it seems hardly compatible
with recognition of the ICC as an independent body with a separate international
legal personality and respect for its mandate to attempt to alter its foundational
document.99
As can be seen, quite serious questions may be raised about the lawfulness of
parts of Resolution 1593. The question thus arises of whether a person referred
95. Ms Løj, the Danish representative, said that the Danish interpretation was that Resolution 1593 ‘does not
affect the universal jurisdiction of member States in areas such as war crimes’, UN Doc. S/PV.5158, at 6.
96. Art. 103 of the Charter reads, ‘In the event of a conﬂict between the obligations of theMembers of theUnited
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’ The Court, not amember of the UN, however, is obliged
by Art. 21 of the Rome Statute to apply ‘in the ﬁrst place, the Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence’, and ‘applicable treaties’ only ‘in the second place . . . [and] . . . where appropriate’.
Considerable doubt may be expressed about whether the UN Charter could be said to be an ‘applicable
treaty’.
97. A somewhat controversial proposition that was accepted, without real discussion by the Appeals Chamber
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Prosecutor v. Fofana, Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of
JurisdictionMateriae: Illegal Delegation of Powers by theUN, Case No. SCSL 2004–14-AR72(E), 25May 2004,
paras. 55–6; see also the Separate Opinion of Judge Robertson, para. 6.
98. Statements that the Security Council could not rewrite the Rome Statute were also characteristic of the
debate on Security Council Resolution 1422; see Cryer and White, supra note 58, at 151, 153–4. See also
Sarooshi, ‘Peace and Justice’, supra note 89, at 95–8.
99. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, in Prosecutor v. Fofana, Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of
JurisdictionMateriae: Illegal Delegation of Powers by theUN, Case No. SCSL 2004–14-AR72(E), 25May 2004,
para. 28, took the view that the Security Council could alter a treaty entered into with a state, owing to
Art. 103 of the UN Charter. Irrespective of whether or not this is correct, it cannot apply with respect to an
independent international person which is not bound by Art. 103 of the Charter, as it is not a party to the
Charter. The samewould apply to any possible issues of compatibility of Resolution 1593with Art. 19 of the
same agreement.
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to in operative paragraph 6 could be prosecuted. A reasonable argument could be
made that as the ICC is not bound by Article 103, and it is unlikely that operative
paragraph 6 is consistent with either Article 13(b) or 16, that such a person could
be prosecuted. The nationality state of such a suspect, however, would be likely
to argue that the offending aspects of Resolution 1593 are not severable from the
resolution as a whole and therefore the entire reference is void if the exemption is
unlawful.100 It seems unlikely that the Court would accept such an argument if it
deprived the ICC of jurisdiction generally. After all, the Rome Statute sets out what
it may do in the event that the Security Council refers a matter; that other aspects
do not conform to its Statute would be likely to be held by the ICC to be a matter of
supreme immateriality. The UN Secretary-General and the ICC have so far treated
the reference as prima facie valid under Article 13(b).101
In practice, it is extremely unlikely that any caseswill be brought against person-
nel referred to in operative paragraph 6. There are no credible allegations against
such personnel which come remotely close to those alleged against the parties to
the Sudan conﬂict. Given this, it might be wondered why operative paragraph 6
was so important for the United States in particular.102 The answer lies not in the
likelihood of such charges being brought, but in the establishment of a precedent
for ‘immunity’ from the ICC, and the normalization of such immunities. Patterson
made this quite clear in the Security Council chamber:
The language providing protection for the United States and other contributing States
is precedent setting as it clearly acknowledges the concerns of States not party to the
Rome Statute and recognises that persons from those States should not be vulnerable
to investigation or prosecution by the ICC, absent consent by those States or a referral
by the Security Council. We believe that, in the future, absent consent of the State
involved, any investigations or prosecutions of nationals of non-party States should
come only pursuant to a decision by the Security Council . . . Protection from the
jurisdiction of the Court should not be viewed as unusual.103
The questionof exemptingpeople from the jurisdictionof the ICC, irrespective of
its legality, also raises other important questions of the compliance of the operation
of the international criminal law system with basic standards of the rule of law.
In particular because the United States has taken the view that it is establishing a
precedent in relation to immunity from the jurisdictionof the ICC, and the concerns
expressed by a number of other states, it is worth looking at the rule of law issues
raised by Resolution 1593.
100. The position with respect to perhaps the closest analogue, declarations under Art. 36(2) of the ICJ Statute
containing invalid reservations, is not clear; see, e.g., J. Collier and V. Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in
International Law: Institutions and Procedures (1997), 143–5.
101. See Letter from the Secretary-General to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 1 April 2005,
and Situation in Darfur, Decision Assigning the Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-2/05,
21 April 2005.
102. The same might be said in relation to Resolution 1422; see R. Lavalle, ‘A Vicious Storm in a Teacup: The
Action by the United Nations Security Council to Narrow the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court’, (2003) 14 Criminal Law Forum 195.
103. UN Doc. S/PV.5158, at 3 (Mrs Patterson).
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5. RESOLUTION 1593 AND THE RULE OF LAW104
The rule of law is a foundational value in legal systems,105 and it is also onewhich is
consistently referred to in international criminal law, fromRobert Jackson’s seminal
opening speech at theNuremberg InternationalMilitary Tribunal106 tomore recent
UN efforts, such as the Expert Seminar on Democracy and the Rule of Law.107 It is
true that the rule of law isnot an entirely determinate idea, and it has been criticized,
particularly byMarxists, for indeterminacy and, according to some, itsmystiﬁcatory
nature.108 It is true that the rule of law is by no means fully determinate in all its
forms, and the nature of the international system is not always fertile soil for its
fulﬁlment.109
Nonetheless, there is broad consensus that, if nothing else, the rule of law requires
that like cases are treated alike.110 As to itsmystiﬁcatory role, if it has one, thismust
be balanced against the considerable protective role the equal applicability of the
law has for the weak.111 Even critics of aspects of the rule of law, such as Martti
Koskenniemi,112 appear to grant the importance of the equal applicability of law.113
Critics have also yet to provide a feasible alternative which grants the same level
of protection to the weak.114 Even if the rule of law does exhaust the grounds on
which law may be critiqued (and it does not), any mystiﬁcatory effect can also
be counterbalanced by using rule of law ideals as a form of immanent critique.
Immanent critique is something towhich international criminal law is particularly
susceptible, given the suffusion of its rhetoric with references to the rule of law.115
5.1. The principle of equality
Tobeginwiththematterof thereferral itself: theargumentcanbemadethatallowing
the Security Council a role in referring situations to the ICC implicates rule of law
issues. The idea underlyingArticle 13(b)was to render the creation of further ad hoc
tribunals like the ICTY and the ICTR unnecessary, since the ICC could be used
instead.116 The creation of those tribunals had been criticized on the basis that they
104. This section builds on themes originally considered inCryer, supranote 54, ch. 4, whichwas completed prior
to the Security Council action on Darfur.
105. On the rule of law generally see B. Z. Tamanaha,On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (2004).
106. 1 Trial of MajorWar Criminals, Nuremberg, at 81.
107. See Expert Seminar on Democracy and the Rule of Law, Geneva, 28 February–2 March 2005, Conclu-
sions and Recommendations, paras. 20–4, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/democracy/
docs/newconclusions1.pdf
108. See, e.g., C. Mie´ville, Between Equal Rights: AMarxist Theory of International Law (2005), 314–18.
109. See, e.g., Broomhall, supra note 49, ch. 4.
110. See, e.g., L. L. Fuller, TheMorality of Law (1969), ch. 3; H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1994), 160. Tamanaha,
supra note 105, at 66, 93–4, 119–22.
111. See, e.g., E. P. Thompson,Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act (1975), 262–3; Tamanaha, supra note
105, at 75.
112. Koskenniemi, supra note 4.
113. As much would appear to ﬂow from ibid., at 496–509. This includes some of the most vituperative critics of
international criminal law from the left; see M. Mandel, How America Gets Away with Murder: Illegal Wars,
Collateral Damage and Crimes Against Humanity (2004), 207–53.
114. Tamanaha, supra note 105, at 85.
115. See Cryer, supra note 54, at 197–8.
116. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 91, at 345.
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were examples of selective justice.117 As they were set up to deal with particular
circumstances, critics have noted that other situations may not receive Council
attention.118 Indeed, situations which directly involve the interests or nationals
of one of the permanent members, which could veto any Council resolution, are
particularly unlikely to be dealt with.
The same criticism may be applied to Article 13(b).119 For example, the Security
Council is almost certain not to refer the situation in Chechnya to the ICC. The Su-
danese permanent representativewas not slow to pick up on this aspect to excoriate
theCouncil for passing the situation inDarfur to the ICC: ‘While theCouncil is keen
on holding my country to account and to urge it to hold trials and achieve security
and stability and overnight, in a territory whose area approximates that of Iraq, we
ﬁnd that very sameCouncil continuing to use the policy of double standards.’120 Al-
though the Sudanese government could hardly be considered an objective observer
on this matter, and the appropriate reaction is not to refuse to prosecute, but to
prosecute equally,121 ad hoc reactions by the Security Council can be open to this
type of criticism.122
Itmight be thought that this could be obviated by granting universal jurisdiction
to the ICC, thus rendering every situation in the world subject to the proprio motu
powers of the Prosecutor.123 Although this provedpolitically impossible at Rome,124
evenif the ICChadbeengranteduniversal jurisdiction itwouldnot inanyeventhave
overcome the problem. In addition to jurisdiction, the ICC needs co-operation, and
even if the ICCwere to be given universal jurisdiction, basic principles of treaty law
(i.e. the pacta tertiis principle) mean that the Rome Statute could not have imposed
on non-parties a duty to co-operate.125 Only the Security Council has the power to
impose a duty to co-operate on non-party states, and if the Security Council were to
choose to do this it would also be subject to the veto. Therefore, in practice, whether
the ICCwas given universal jurisdiction or not, the criticism of the selective nature
of Security Council activity would still have relevance.126 This serves as a sobering
reminder that the international legal order is not one in which the rule of law is
117. See J. E. Alvarez, ‘Crimes of Hate/Crimes of State: Lessons FromRwanda’, (1999) 24Yale Journal of International
Law 365, at 452–6.
118. See, e.g., D. Harris, ‘Problems and Progress in Establishing an International Criminal Court’, (1998) 3 Journal
of Armed Conﬂict Law 1, at 3.
119. SeeWilliams, supra note 91, at 349. As, indeed, it has been, see infra note 134 and accompanying text.
120. S/PV.5158, p.12 (Mr Erwa).
121. See N. Boister, ‘The ICJ in the Belgian Arrest Warrant Case: Arresting the Development of International
Criminal Law’, (2002) 7 Journal of Conﬂict and Security Law 293, at 314. The Appeals Chamber in the Cˇelebic´i
case also noted that the remedy for a claim of selective enforcement of the law was not non-prosecution,
Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Mucic´, Delic´ and Landzˇo, Judgment, IT-96–21-A, para. 618.
122. See, e.g., A. Bianchi, ‘Ad-hocism and the Rule of Law’, (2002) 13 EJIL 263.
123. Pursuant to Arts. 13(c) and 15 of the Rome Statute, see generally P. Kirsch and D. Robinson, ‘Initiation of
Proceedings by the Prosecutor’ , in Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones, supra note 62, at 657.
124. SeeH.-P. Kaul and C. Kress, ‘Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the International Criminal Court’,
(1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 143.
125. 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 34. See O. Bekou and R. Cryer,
‘Introduction’, in O. Bekou and R. Cryer (eds.), The International Criminal Court (2004), xi, at xvi. Operative
paragraph 2 of Resolution 1593 notes that non-parties do not have duties under the Statute.
126. It ought to be noted inmitigation that the formal imposition of a duty is only one of the factors that has led
to co-operation in relation to the ad hoc tribunals; see, e.g., R. Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, Politics and Diplomacy (2004), 128.
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easy to realize.127 On the other hand, this should not blind us to the extraordinary
fact that owing to the surprising actions of the Security Council, prosecutions for
extremely serious crimes are likely now to occur, when they were unlikely to have
done so if the Security Council had no role in referring cases to the ICC.
Questions of the compliance of Resolution 1593 with rule of law desiderata do
not end here, however. Operative paragraph 6 of Resolution 1593 raised more than
a few eyebrows in the Security Council. The fact that the situation was referred,
but that personnel from non-party states to the Rome Statute outside Sudan were
said to be subject solely to the exclusive jurisdiction of their sending state, does
raise further rule of law issues. The law is meant to apply to all equally – to grant
exemptionsbased solelyonnationality appears tobe inconsistentwith theprinciple
of treating like cases alike. Such was the theme of a number of comments in the
Security Council. For example the permanent representative of Algeria noted his
‘regret that, out of a concern for compromise at all costs and atwhatever price, those
defending theprinciple of universal justicehave in fact ensured that, in this domain,
the use of double standards . . . and a two track justice were most unexpectedly
demonstrated’.128
Perhapsunsurprisingly, theSudanesepermanent representativewasmost critical
of this aspect of the resolution: ‘To the claimmadeby some that this resolution sends
a message to all the parties that no one will now enjoy impunity, I would add – in
order to avoid hypocrisy – “Except if he belongs to a certain category of states.”’129
Although it must be remembered that this is not, per se, an argument against
prosecution, and that Sudan is not impartial here, the legitimacy of the referral is
impaired by the a-priori exclusion of non-party state nationals from the jurisdiction
of the ICC. As mentioned above, there are no reasons to believe that any non-party
state nationals are among thosemost responsible for international crimes in Sudan,
so the point is not that the jurisdiction of the ICC will be signiﬁcantly limited in a
practical fashion, but that the exclusion of some states’ nationals fails to respect the
Prosecutor’s independence and makes it difﬁcult to reconcile the resolution with
the principle of equality before the law. Some states’ nationals, it would appear, are
more equal than others.
The fundamental question in relation to this resolution is, however, whether
it would be being too precious about principle to maintain that the system of
international criminal justice would be better off if the referral had not been made.
In other words, would it have been acceptable to have risked the possibility that
no one be prosecuted for their actions in Sudan by taking a stand against the
exceptionalist claims of operative paragraph 6 and the possible legitimizing effect
of such exemptions (and immunity agreements in general)? This is an extremely
difﬁcult area, one which was perhaps most clearly dealt with by the Philippines in
127. See Broomhall, supra note 49, at 54.
128. Un Doc. S/PV.5158, at 5 (Mr Baali); see also Argentina, 7–8 (Mr Mayoral); Benin, 10 (Mr Adechi); Brazil, 11
(Mr Sardenberg).
129. Ibid., at 12 (Mr Erwa).
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the Security Council:
We . . . believe that the International Criminal Court (ICC) may be a casualty of res-
olution 1593. Operative paragraph 6 of the resolution is killing its credibility – softly
perhaps, but killing it nevertheless.Wemay ask whether the Security Council has the
prerogative to limit themandate of the jurisdiction of the ICC under the Rome Statute
once the exercise of jurisdictionhas advanced.Operative paragraph6 subtly subsumed
the independence of the ICC into the political and diplomatic vagaries of the Security
Council. Nevertheless, that eventuality may well be worth the sacriﬁce if impunity is,
indeed, ended in Darfur, if human rights are, indeed, ﬁnally protected and promoted;
and if, indeed, the rule of law there is upheld.130
Perhaps in this situation it is best to accept that perfect compliance with rule
of law standards remains some way off, but that it is better to ensure that some
international crimes are prosecuted than to risk no prosecutions by too strict an
application of principle. Politics may remain a dirty business, but impunity is still
being progressively limited by the referral of the situation to the ICCby the Security
Council.
5.2. Neo-colonialism131
The debate over international criminal law has, over the past decade, also taken on
aspectsof theNorth–Southconﬂict ininternationalsocietyasawhole.Thishascome
through in a number of ways. First, the conﬂict between rich and poor states arose
in Rome in relation to the substantive jurisdiction of the ICC. In the ﬁnal version
of the Rome Statute, provisions that would have included a comprehensive ban on
chemical and biological weapons in the Statute were excluded, as a quid pro quo
for a number of developing states dropping their insistence that the Rome Statute
include a ban on nuclear weapons. The argument was that if developed states were
able to exclude their weapons of mass destruction (nuclear weapons) from the ICC
regime, then poor countries ought to be able to do the same (in relation to chemical
and biological weapons).132 Universal jurisdiction has also come under ﬁre on this
count, in particular in the Yerodia case, where both President Guillaume and (more
angrily) Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula criticized assertions of universal jurisdiction on the
basis that they weremore likely to bemade by powerful countries at the expense of
weaker states.133
Against this background it is no surprise that Sudan claimed, in no uncertain
terms, that the referral, and indeed the ICC itself, was anothermechanism bywhich
relationships of colonial dominance were perpetuated. The Sudanese permanent
130. Ibid., at 6 (Mr Baja).
131. Forarecentworkassertingthat international lawisdeﬁnedbythecolonialencounterseeA.Angie,Sovereignty,
Imperialismand theMakingof InternationalLaw (2005); foraworkraising these issues inrespectof international
criminal law see P. J. C. Schimmelpennick van der Oije, ‘A Surinam Crime Before a Dutch Court: Universal
Jurisdiction or a Post-Colonial Injustice?’, (2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 455.
132. See H. von Hebel and D. Robinson, ‘Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court’, in R. S. Lee, supra note 79,
at 79, 113–16, esp. 116.
133. Yerodia, supra note 82, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula, paras. 9–14; ibid., Separate Opinion of
President Guillaume, para. 15. See Cryer, supra note 54, 95–6.
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representative asserted that the actions of the Council
exposed the fact that this criminal court was originally intended for developing and
weak States, and that it is a tool for the exercise of the culture of superiority and to
impose cultural superiority. It is a tool for thosewhobelieve that theyhave amonopoly
on virtues in this world, rife with injustice and tyranny. . . . The Council even goes so
far as to afﬁrm that exceptions are only formajor powers and that thisCourt is simply a
stick used forweak States and that it is an extension of this Council of yours,whichhas
always only adopted resolutions and sanctions against weak countries, while major
Powers and those under their protection ride roughshod over the Resolutions of the
Council, cynically disregard them and consider them a dead letter.134
Wecanseehere that thecriticismof selective enforcementof the lawcanalso take
ona further dimension.However, to go fromthe criticism that some states’ nationals
are exempt, to the position that seeking to ensure prosecution of international
crimes is a means of imposing values and an exercise of cultural superiority, is an
attempt to leap a chasm in two bounds. First, it is simply incorrect to assert that the
prohibitions of international criminal law at issue in Sudan are the manifestation
of parochial views on appropriate behaviour. Sudan is a party, for example, to the
Geneva Conventions, and thus has expressly accepted Common Article 3 of those
conventions, which prohibits attacks on those not taking part in hostilities and
acts of inhumanity towards those persons. Crimes against humanity, genocide, and
many war crimes are not only prohibited by customary international law, but are
norms of jus cogens,135 the proof of which requires evidence of acceptance by the
international community of states as a whole.136 The prohibitions of international
criminal law constitute one area in which claims of cultural relativism have little
purchase.137 It might be noted that a good proportion of Sudan’s neighbours have
referred themselves to the ICC, showing support in the locality for international
criminal law and the ICC. Also, Sudan has signed (albeit not ratiﬁed) the Rome
Statute, and thus proffered some support for the law it contains.
However, Sudanmay not have been asserting that the law itself was problematic.
Thestatementappears tocriticizemorethefact that theICCratherthantheSudanese
criminal justice system is being used to prosecute offences. China offered some
support for this positionwhen it noted its preference for theSudanese justice system
to be used to prosecute offences rather than the ICC.138 Two responsesmay bemade
to this argument. The ﬁrst is that Resolution 1593 did not come about in a vacuum.
As was noted earlier, Sudan had already agreed that events deserving prosecution
had occurred, and undertook to begin prosecutions. Resolution 1593was a response
134. UNDoc. S/PV.5158, at 12 (Mr Erwa).
135. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (2003), 488–9; L. N. Sadat, The International Criminal Court and
the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New Millennium (2002), at 108; M. C. Bassiouni, Crimes
Against Humanity In International Criminal Law (1999), 210–17; L. May,Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative
Account (2005), ch. 2.
136. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 53. Many, although not all, war crimes can be so described;
see B. S. Brown, ‘The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction’ (2001) 35 New England Law Review 383, at
393.
137. SeeS.Ratner and J.Abrams,Accountability forHumanRightsAtrocities in International Law:Beyond theNuremberg
Paradigm (2001), 24–5.
138. UN Doc. S/PV.5158, 5 (MrWang).
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to Sudan repeatedly failing to live up to the promises it made. As the International
Commission of Inquiry noted, Sudanhad by that time proved itself to be unable and
unwilling to prosecute offences. So the movement for prosecution originated from
Sudan itself.
The second response relates to the nature of the ICC. It must be remembered
that unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC does not have primary jurisdiction over
offences subject to its jurisdiction. Owing to concerns about sovereignty, the ICC is
complementary to national jurisdictions.139 The ICC only steps in when a state is
unwilling or unable to prosecute, and, by virtue of Article 18 of the Rome Statute,
states have a chance to argue that they are genuinely willing or able to prosecute.
Despite the fact that the Security Council has referred the situation in Darfur to the
ICC, theprincipleof complementarity still applies.Therehavebeensuggestions that
when the Security Council refers a situation to the ICC complementarity does not
apply.140 However, this is highly doubtful.141 In the particular situation, moreover,
the possibility of complementarity being displaced does not arise. There is no lan-
guage inResolution 1593 that could conceivably be interpreted as having this result.
Indeed operative paragraph 4 of that resolution ‘encourages the Court, as appropri-
ate and in accordance with the Rome Statute, to support international cooperation
with domestic efforts to promote the rule of law, protect human rights and combat
impunity in Darfur’, which would support precisely the opposite conclusion. The
ICC Prosecutor has taken the view that the principle of complementarity applies
to Security Council referrals, and has engaged in an analysis of the admissibility of
cases fromDarfur.142
The Prosecutor has taken the view that Sudanese action so far is not of a nature
to require the ICC to defer to Sudan under the complementarity principle, but
wished to ‘emphasise that this decision does not represent a determination on
the Sudanese legal system, but is essentially a result of the absence of criminal
proceedings relating to cases onwhich the OTP [Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor] is likely to
focus’.143 TheProsecutor alsonoted that afterhis decision to initiate an investigation
Sudan informed him of the setting up of a domestic special tribunal to prosecute
some offences in Sudan, he explained that ‘the admissibility assessment is an on-
going assessment that relates to the speciﬁc cases to be prosecuted by the Court . . .
As part of the on-going admissibility assessment the OTP will follow the work of
the tribunal to determine . . . whether any such proceedings meet the standards of
genuineness as deﬁned by article 17 of the Statute.’144 So Sudan will still have a
chance to show that it is willing and able to prosecute offences itself.145 And if it can
139. See J. T. Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’, in Cassese, Gaeta and Jones, supra note
62, at 667.
140. SeeR.B.Phillips, ‘TheInternationalCriminalCourtStatute: JurisdictionandAdmissibility’, (1999)10Criminal
Law Forum 61, at 64–6, 84–5.
141. See, e.g., Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice, prepared for the ICC Ofﬁce of the
Prosecutor, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/, 21.
142. Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the Security
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) (hereafter Ocampo Report), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int, 3–4.
143. Ibid., at 4.
144. Ibid.
145. Pursuant to Art. 18.
SUDAN, RESOLUTION 1593, AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 221
prove this, then the ICC will have to defer to Sudan’s prosecutions, subject to the
right of oversight enshrined in Article 18(5) of the Rome Statute. In such a situation
the ICCwill have fulﬁlled its role, by ensuring that international crimes are fully and
fairly prosecuted. It is only if Sudan continues to default on its own assurances that
itwould prosecute that the ICCwill step in. The ICC canbe seen to be the enforcer of
undertakings entered intobySudan. Itmay thereforebe concluded that the criticism
of Resolution 1593 on the basis that it is neo-colonial, rather than selective in some
respects, is not well founded.
6. CONCLUSION
Resolution1593might be seen as strong actionby the SecurityCouncil, and inmany
ways it was.146 International criminal law and its enforcement seem to have been
mainstreamedintotheSecurityCouncil’sresponsefromanearlystage.Thiscertainly
was not the sort of response to such actions before the 1990s, and the reaction to the
situation in Sudan does reﬂect a large swing towards the politics of accountability.
Before then the question, if it was even asked, was whether prosecutions ought
to be initiated. Now the question is what the most appropriate mechanism for
ensuring effective prosecution is. In addition, the fact that the United States could
be persuaded to abstain from vetoing the resolution itself could be seen as a mild
thawing in its attitude towards the ICC. The stridency of the commentsmade in the
Security Council by the US permanent representative militates against any quick
triumphalism on this point, however. The United States has not been won over to
the cause of the ICC, although its abstention is amove away from the scathing anti-
ICC rhetoric that has characterized the contributions of some members of the US
government to the debate.147 It is true that the US abstention did not come free. The
price the US exacted for its abstention was language in Resolution 1593 that could
be interpreted as legitimatingUS views on the acceptable scope of the Rome Statute,
or even undermining the delicate compromise achieved at Rome. It is a matter of
judgement whether the reference was worth the price.
Although considerable delight may be expressed about the fact that the Security
Council has decided, in a relatively short time, to make use of the ICC, despite the
concerns of some of its permanent members, this is not the end of the matter. An
interesting question for the Security Council will be Sudanese co-operation. It has
requested that the Prosecutor keep it informedon the implementationofResolution
1593, but Sudanhas already said that itwill not co-operatewith the ICC.148Whether
theSecurityCouncil (or individual states including theUnitedStates)will bewilling
146. For positive, albeit not hagiographic, assessments, see E. Keppler and Y. J. Revilla, ‘Council Makes Historic
Referral on Darfur to ICC’, [April 2005] 29 International Criminal Court Monitor 1; S. Ford, ‘Does the US Really
Want Justice for Darfur?’, [April 2005] 29 International Criminal Court Monitor 5.
147. See, e.g., J. R. Bolton, ‘The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court From an American
Perspective’, (2000–1) 41 Virginia Journal of International Law 186. Vituperative comment is not limited to
members of the Bush administration, however; see J. Rabkin, ‘Worlds Apart on International Justice’, (2002)
15 Leiden Journal of International Law 835.
148. Although there have been exploratory meetings between the Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor and ofﬁcials of the
Sudanese government; Ocampo Report, supra note 142, at 5.
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or able to proffer the necessary carrots and apply the necessary sticks to ensure co-
operation remains to be seen.
As noted above, the reaction to Darfur in some ways mirrors that in relation to
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Therefore it is not entirely surprising that some
of the criticisms of the Security Council in relation to Yugoslavia are also applicable
here. In Yugoslavia (and Rwanda), the Council was criticized for using international
criminal lawand thecreationof international criminal tribunals ‘mostly [as] apublic
relations ploy, namely to create an ad hoc tribunal to appear to be doing something
about human rights violations . . . without major risk’.149 The same may be said
about Darfur. Sending the matter to the ICC does mean that the Security Council
is doing something, but other ways of limiting the conﬂict in Darfur are not being
pursued as rigorously as they ought to be. Although the referral of the situation to
the ICC iswelcome, the referral occurs against a background of the Security Council
offering little support or assistance to the small, undermanned, under-equipped and
probablyunder-mandatedAfricanUnionpeacekeeping force that isworkingagainst
theodds tobring the conﬂict inDarfur to anend. TheSecurityCouncil has expressed
its support for the African Union mission,150 and NATO has offered some material
support,151 but this is unlikely to prove sufﬁcient to end the conﬂict. Therefore the
referring of the matter to the ICC may be seen as stationing an ambulance at the
bottom of a cliff, rather than erecting a fence at the top. Prevention is better than
cure.
Although the referring of the situation in Darfur to the ICC is very welcome,
the reference comes with a number of problematic caveats. Against a background
of the still possibly selective enforcement of international criminal law (especially
by the Security Council), the situation shows that no matter how far it has come,
international criminal law still has a way to go before it represents a system that
truly reﬂects rule of law principles. The development of international criminal law
in the last decade andahalf gives reason forhope, butno cause for quick conclusions
about the inevitable forwardmarch of international criminal law against the forces
of realpolitik. As is so often the case, the evidence is mixed. But it would not be
appropriatetoendthispieceonanentirelydownbeatnote.Underneaththeproblems
lies a signiﬁcant acceptance by amajority of the Security Council that the ICC is an
institution that, in the quest for peace and justice, is a worthy companion.
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